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STUDENT ARTICLES
Who Bears the Burden of Proof Under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§1681e(b)? Consumers May Bear the
Biggest Burden in This Climate of
Heightened National Security
Jennifer Cuculich*

I. Introduction
The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") is intended to help
consumers protect their privacy and reputation by preventing the
dissemination of inaccurate information.' Specifically, 15 U.S.C.
§ 168 1e(b) requires that a credit reporting agency follow "reasonable
procedures" to ensure maximum accuracy in credit reports. 2 In the
past two decades, the courts of appeals have been divided over who
bears the burden of proof in actions brought under § 168le(b): must a
plaintiff show that the agency did not use reasonable procedures in
maintaining a plaintiffs credit file, or must the agency show that it
did?
As a result of recent acts of terrorism, increased national
security interests have further complicated the question. The recently
passed USA PATRIOT Act contains amendments to the FCRA that
allows the government greater access to private credit information.

*

J.D. from Loyola University Chicago School of Law, expected May 2003.

B.A. Psychology and Economics from Boston College, 1996.
1 See Williams v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 892 F. Supp 951 (E.D. Mich.
1995); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Credit Bureau, 594 F. Supp. 229 (M.D. Pa.
1984); Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2001).
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These amendments place a higher priority on national security than
on individual privacy, and they threaten to chip away at individual
privacy interests. As a result of the government's actions, there is a
possibility that individual businesses, such as credit reporting
agencies, will follow suit and also cut back on privacy interests. The
potential effect on consumers is that their private credit information
will be made available to more people. In light of this potential
effect, when consumers bring actions against credit reporting
agencies, the courts should recognize that while plaintiffs bear the
burden of proof, showing that the agency kept an inaccurate report is
enough to meet this burden.
Part II of this article will discuss the history of the FCRA and
the provisions of the FCRA relating to consumer actions. Part III will
review the most recent appellate cases from the Eleventh, Ninth, D.C.
and Fourth circuits addressing the issue of who bears the burden of
proof for § 1681e(b) claims. Part IV will discuss the reasoning
employed by these courts and suggest other factors, such as the
recent passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, that may affect the way
courts analyze this issue. While the USA PATRIOT Act threatens
individual privacy interests, the courts must in turn make efforts to
preserve those interests. Therefore, Part V will propose that the
courts adopt a consumer-friendly approach when deciding the burden
of proof issue in light of the recent anti-terrorism legislation. While
the courts must recognize that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof
under § 168le(b), they also must allow plaintiffs' claims to proceed,
as the D.C. and Fourth circuit courts have done, when the claim
involves "crucial" questions or damaging inconsistencies.

II. Background
In 1970, Congress enacted the FCRA 3 in response to abuses
in the consumer reporting industry.4 Employers had begun to place
increased reliance on consumer reporting agencies to provide
background checks on prospective employees. 5 Congress found that
agencies were frequently reporting inaccurate information that was
adversely affecting individuals. 6 As one member of the House noted
3 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as

amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u. (2000)).
4 Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 414 (4th Cir. 2001).
5 Id.
6 id.
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that "with the trend toward. . .the establishment of all sorts of
computerized data banks, the individual is in great danger of having
his life and character reduced to impersonal 'blips' and key-punch
holes in a stolid and unthinking machine which can literally ruin his
reputation without cause, and make him unemployable. 7 Congress
intended the FCRA to provide consumers with a remedy for the
damage caused by inaccurate credit reports. Furthermore, individual
privacy is a primary concern of § 1681e(b). 9 As one court noted,
however, Congress intended to prevent unreasonable and careless
invasions of consumer privacy, but did not
10 intend to prevent the
dissemination of critical credit information.
Congress adopted a variety of measures when it enacted the
FCRA to ensure that credit reporting agencies report accurate
information. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b) provides that
"[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report
it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom
the report relates."" The FCRA provides specific procedures a credit
reporting agency must follow when accuracy is disputed. 12 For
example, an agency must reinvestigate disputed information, delete
all information that cannot be verified, and allow the consumer to file
a statement regarding any disputed information that remains after
reinvestigation. A consumer has a right to sue when an agency
either intentionally' 4 or negligently' 5 fails to follow reasonable

7

Id. (citing 116 CONG. REc. 36570 (1970)).

8

See Amanda L. Fuchs, Comment, The Absurdity of the FTC's Interpretation

of the Fair Credit Reporting Act's Application to Workplace Investigations: Why
Courts Should Look Instead to the Legislative History, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 339, 342
(2001) (reviewing the legislative history of the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (finding that "there is a need to insure that

consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness,
impartiality, and a respectfor the consumer's right to privacy.") (emphasis added).
1o In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Testify Befoie Grand Jury Directed to
TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
" 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b) (2000).
12

15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2000).

13 Id.
14

15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2000) (providing that anyone who "willfully fails to

comply" with reasonable procedures may be liable for actual damages, punitive

damages and costs, including attorney's fees).
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procedures. The statute is silent, however, on whether the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that the agency did not follow reasonable
procedures in procuring a credit report, or whether the agency has the
burden of proving that it did.

III. Discussion
Inevitably, when a statute is silent in regard to an aspect of
the legislation, different interpretations will arise. Accordingly, on
the issue of who bears the burden of proof in showing reasonableness
of procedure, the circuits are split. Both the Eleventh and Ninth
circuits have implied that the burden is on the consumer reporting
agency to show that it followed reasonable procedures. On the other
hand, both the D.C. and Fourth circuits have clearly placed the
burden on the plaintiff to show that the agency failed to follow
reasonable procedures.
A. The Eleventh Circuit: Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.
In Cahlin, a consumer brought an action against two credit
reporting agencies, TRW, Inc. and The Credit Bureau Incorporated of
Georgia ("CBI"), alleging a violation of § 1681e(b). 16 Cahlin, the
plaintiff, leased a car for a five-year term from General Motors
Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") on June 3, 1985.17 Although the
written lease provided that Cahlin would be liable for any amounts
owed as a result of early termination, Cahlin alleged that he received
an oral promise that if he returned the car within ninety days he
would be released from this obligation.18 Cahlin returned the car on
August 27, 1985.19 In November and December of the same year,
GMAC sent notices to Cahlin demanding $3,842.44 on the lease and
threatening legal action. 20 Cahlin settled the dispute in January of
15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2000) (providing that any person who negligently fails
to follow reasonable procedures may be liable for actual damages and the costs of
the action, including attorney's fees).
16 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir.
15

1991).
17

Id.

18

Id.

19 Id.
20

Id.
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1986 by promising to pay $2,000 as full satisfaction for his
outstanding debt. 2 1 Cahlin paid the agreed amount by May 1, 1986
and received a general release from GMAC discharging him from his
previous debt.
In August of 1985, GMAC began reporting to CBI that
Cahlin's account was delinquent and that the account had been
charged off its books as an active receivable.23 Consequently, CBI
gave Cahlin's GMAC account an "19" rating, which signifies that the
account has been charged off or is bad debt. After Cahlin settled his
account and received a release from GMAC, GMAC informed CBI
that the loss had been paid in full and that Cahlin's account should be
changed accordingly. 5 In response, CBI changed the balance on
Cahlin's GMAC account to zero, but continued to keep the "19"
rating on the report.26 In August of 1986, after reading a copy of his
CBI credit report, Cahlin mailed a customer dispute form to CBI
along with a copy of the release he had received from GMAC.2827
CBI's only response was to send Cahlin a copy of his credit report.
After receiving numerous complaints from Cahlin, GMAC
sent a letter to CBI in October of 1986 asking the company to change
Cahlin's account rating from an "19" to an "I-1., 2 9 An "I-1" rating
signifies that a debt has been paid within thirty days of billing. 30 In
response, CBI changed the current status of Cahlin's GMAC account
to an "I-1" rating, but relocated the
31 "19" rating to the previous credit
history section of Cahlin's report.
Finally, in October of 1987, Cahlin sent a letter to CBI asking
them to remove the "19" rating from the previous history section of

21

Id.

22

Id. at 1154-55.

23

Id. at 1155.

24

id.

25

id.

26

Id.

27

id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

id.

31 Id.
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his GMAC account. 32 After contacting GMAC, CBI deleted any
reference to an "19" rating from Cahlin's report and, by November of
1987, CBI ceased reporting any adverse information about Cahlin's
GMAC account. 33 Nevertheless, Cahlin alleged that as a result of
CBI's inaccurate credit reports he was denied credit on numerous
occasions between October of 1986 and November of 1987. 34
Cahlin also alleged that TRW, another credit reportin3
agency, reported erroneous information about his GMAC account.
Prior to June of 1986, TRW reported Cahlin's GMAC account as a
"loss charge off." 3 6 In June, GMAC instructed TRW to change
Cahlin's account to a more favorable "paid charge off' status.37 After
complaints from Cahlin, GMAC further directed TRW to change
Cahlin's account to a "Code 13," which signifies a paid account with
a zero balance. 38 Finally, after receiving a letter from Cahlin, TRW
changed Cahlin's account
to reflect that the GMAC account was
"paid satisfactory." 39
Cahlin alleged that his application for a residential mortgage
loan was denied as a result of an inaccurate TRW report.40 He did not
produce any evidence to that effect, however, and the bank records
subpoenaed by TRW did not indicate that the TRW credit report was
a factor in denying his application. 4 1 The district court granted
summary judgment for TRW and CBI, holding that Cahlin failed to
satisfy his threshold burden of showin2 that the credit agencies had
reported any "inaccurate" information. 2 On the contrary, the court
found that both CBI and TRW had accurately reported Cahlin's
credit information. 4 3 Cahlin appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit Court

32

Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1155.

33 Id.
34

Id.

35 id.
36 Id.
37 Id.

38 id.
39 Id.
40

Id. at 1156.

41 Id.
42

Id. at 1154.

43 Id.

2002]

Burden of ProofUnder the FairCreditReporting Act

311

of Appeals affirmed. 44
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the FCRA implicitly
requires a plaintiff to present evidence showing that a credit reporting
agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information. If the
plaintiff cannot make out this prima facie case, there is no violation
of § 1681e(b).4 6 However, if a plaintiff meets this initial burden, the
court must then inquire into the reasonableness of the agency's
procedures. 4 7 The court further held that in order to escape liability,
an agency must establish that the inaccurate report was generated by
following reasonable procedures, thus shifting the burden to the
credit reporting agency. The court went on to discuss the meaning
of "accuracy" in credit reporting and found that it should be
construed in an "evenhanded manner" toward the interests of both
consumers and creditors.4 9
While the court refrained from deciding whether or not
Cahlin's report was accurate, the court did find that Cahlin's claim
was without merit. Cahlin contended that his report should have
been free of any adverse information. 5 1 The court, however, found
that a debt that was charged off by a creditor and later settled for less

44id.
45

Id. at 1156.

46id.
47 Id.

48 Id.
49 Id. at 1157-58. The court noted that there are two different approaches to

defining accuracy in credit reports. Id. at 1157. The first, which was adopted by the
district court in Cahlin, allows an agency to satisfy its duty under the FCRA if it
produces a report that is "technically accurate." Id. This means that the information
is factually correct, even though it might be misleading or incomplete. Id. The

second approach rejects this position and requires agencies to ensure "maximum
possible accuracy." Id. This means that although a report may be factually correct,
if it is incomplete or misleading, a claim will survive summary judgment. Id. In this
case, the court did not feel the need to choose one approach over the other. Id.
Cahlin alleged that CBI should have ceased reporting any adverse credit
information. Id. at 1158. The court recognized that agencies have a duty to report
all credit information, not just information that is beneficial to consumers. Thus,
while agency procedures must be fair to the consumer, they must also be fair to
creditors by reporting the whole picture. Id. The standard of accuracy must
therefore be objective and "evenhanded" toward consumers and creditors. Id.
'o Id. at 1159.
51

id.
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52
than the original amount due should be included on a credit report.
This information is important to future creditors and it creates
a more
53
accurate report than one containing no adverse information.

B. The Ninth Circuit: Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Reporting
Agency
In Guimond, a consumer brought an action under the FCRA
alleging that Trans Union Credit Information Company ("Trans
Union") negligently failed to correct inaccurate information in her
credit report. Guimond, the plaintiff, became aware of inaccuracies
in her credit report and notified Trans Union of the inaccuracies in
October of 1989. 55 Her credit report falsely stated that she was
married, that she was also known as "Ruth Guimond," and that she
had a credit card from Saks Fifth Avenue. 56 In response, Trans Union
told Guimond that the inaccurate information had been removed from
her file.5 7 A few months
later, however, Trans Union again published
58
information.
the false
Guimond requested the source of the erroneous information,
but Trans Union told her that they did not know the source. 59 Trans
Union eventually removed the false information from Guimond's
file. During this time Guimond was
never denied credit because of
61
the inaccuracies in her credit report.
Guimond claimed that Trans Union violated, among other
laws, § 168le(b). The district court granted summary judgment for

52

Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1158.

" Id. at 1159 n.19.
54 Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Reporting Agency, 45 F.3d 1329, 1331
(9th
Cir. 1995).
55 Id.
56

Id. at 1332.

57 Id.

58 id.
59 id.
60

id.

61 Id.
62

Id. Guimond's complaint also alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2),

15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c), and California Civil Code § 1785.1 et seq. Id. The court

reversed the grant of summary judgment on Guimond's 1681g(a)(2) and California
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Trans Union, holding that, because Guimond was never denied
credit, she did not suffer any actual damages. 63 Guimond appealed
and the apellate court reviewed the granting of summary judgment
de novo. In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that 65a
denial of credit is not a prerequisite for recovery under the FCRA.
Therefore, instead of focusing on whether Guimond was denied
credit, the district court should have focused on whether Trans66Union
followed reasonable procedures in preparing her credit report.
Like the court in Cahlin, the Ninth Circuit held that in order
to make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff need only show
inaccuracies in his or her report. 67 The inquiry will then focus on
whether the credit reporting agency followed reasonable procedures
in preparing the report. 68 Thus, Guimond also seems to shift the
burden to the agency to show that they followed reasonable
procedures to ensure accuracy, rather than putting the burden on the
consumer to show that the agency failed to use reasonable
procedures.
C. The D.C. Circuit: Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc.
In Stewart, a consumer brought a claim under § 1681e(b)
against Credit Bureau Inc. ("CBI"). 69 Stewart, the plaintiff, owned a
consulting business that helped individuals and small businesses
obtain credit. 70 Stewart applied for CBI membership and two credit
cards, which he intended to use for his business. 7 ' A CBI
membership would have allowed him to receive CBI's consumer
credit reports so he could help his clients get credit. 72 In December

Civil Code claims, but upheld the grant of summary judgment on the 1681i(c)

claim. Id. at 1334, 1335, 1337.
63 Id. at 1332.
64 id.
65

Id. at 1334.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68 id.
69

Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

70 Id.
71

Id.

72 id.
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1978, Stewart's credit card applications were denied; a few months
later, CBI denied Stewart membership. 73 Stewart claimed that both
denials were caused by inaccurate information in his CBI report.74
After Stewart examined his credit file in person, CBI investigated the
disputed entries. 75 The investigation revealed several errors in
Stewart's credit report, and CBI subsequently made the appropriate
corrections to Stewart's file.76

CBI moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
Stewart suffered no actual harm from CBI's inaccurate reporting.77
The district court found otherwise and held that Stewart's allegations
of damages raised a triable issue of fact. 78 Nonetheless, the court
entered judgment for CBI sua sponte.79 The court reasoned that
Stewart could not prevail at trial because he intended to rely only on
the inaccurate report, rather than carry his80 burden of showing that
CBI failed to follow reasonable procedures.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot merely
rest on an inaccuracy in a credit report and then shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. 8 1 The court found no indication in §168 le(b)
that Congress meant to shift the burden of proof.82 The court noted
that Congress demonstrated that it knew how to shift the burden of
proof to the defendant because it explicitly did so in two other
sections of the FCRA. 83 In addition, the court relied on the
assumption, recognized by several other courts, that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of procedures.
Stewart, 734 F.2d at 49.
74 Id. CBI reinvestigated four of the entries in Stewart's credit file: (1) a wage
earner's plan; (2) an outstanding tax lien from Arlington County, Virginia; (3) late
payments on a Hecht Company account; and (4) late payments on a loan from
Virginia National Bank. Id. at 49-50.
75 Id. at 49.
73

76

Id. at 50.

77 id.
78

Id. at 51.

79 id.
80

Id. at 53.

" Id. at 51.
82

Id.

83

Id. at 51 n.5 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§1681d(c), 1681m(c)).

84 Id. at 51 n.5 (citing Morris v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 962, 968
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The court went on to note that credit reporting agencies
should be judged according to what a reasonably prudent person
would do under the circumstances. 85 Determining the reasonableness
of conduct involves "weighing the potential harm from inaccuracy
against the burden of safeguarding against such inaccuracy." 86 In
applying this standard, the court held that a plaintiff need not
introduce direct evidence of unreasonable procedures because, in
some instances, inaccurate credit reports are themselves evidence of
unreasonable procedures. 87 The court relied on two other cases where
plaintiffs prevailed despite their failure to present direct evidence of
the defendants' reporting procedures. 88 In one case, the plaintiff
showed evidence of inconsistent reports. 89 In another case, the
90
plaintiff showed that the agency kept two separate files on him.
Based on this reasoning, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court's
order of summary judgment because "a facial inconsistency between
the wage earner entry and the rest of the file" created a duty for CBI
to reinvestigate. 9 1 The court reasoned that "a failure to investigate
inconsistencies as fundamental as a falsely reported wage earner
plan, or even less fundamental inaccuracies can support a claim of
negligence." 92 Because the district court did not consider whether
on the
CBI fulfilled its duty to reinvestigate, summary judgment
93
issue of reasonableness of procedure was inappropriate.

(1983); Alexander v. Moore & Associates, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 954 (1982)).
85 Id. at 5 1.
86 id.

87

Id. at 52.

Id. at 52 (citing Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Morris v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
89 Id. at 52 (citing Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Mich.
88

1980)).
90 Id. at 52 (citing Morris v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ohio
1983)).
91 Id. at 53.
92

Id. at 52-53.

93

Id. at 53.
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D. The Fourth Circuit: Dalton v. Capital Associated Industries,
Inc.
In Dalton, a job applicant sued a consumer reporting agency
under § 1681e(b) for failing to follow reasonable procedures in
reporting his criminal history to a prospective employer. 94 In 1999,
Dalton interviewed with Sumitomo Electronic Lightwave Corp. for a
position as Regional Sales Manager. 95 The employment application
asked whether Dalton had been convicted of a felony in the past
seven years. 96 Although Dalton was charged with second degree
assault in Colorado, a felony, he ultimately pled guilty to third degree
assault, a misdemeanor. 97 Accordingly, he truthfully stated that he
had not been convicted of a felony. " Dalton was offered the job
99 subject to the successful
completion
of education, employment, and
checks.
criminal background

Sumitomo employed Capital Associated Industries ("CAI") to
conduct a criminal background check on Dalton.100 CAI, however,
did not perform the criminal record check itself.' 0 ' It employed
SafeHands, Inc. to perform the check. 102 In turn, SafeHands engaged
Guaranty Research Services, Inc. ("GRS") to run a state-wide
computer search of criminal records in Colorado. 10 3 GRS found that
Dalton had a criminal record in Jefferson County, but the computer
search did not reveal the specific charge. 10 4 An employee of GRS
then called the county clerk's office to inquire about the nature of the
charge. 10 5 The clerk stated that Dalton had been convicted of third

94

Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2001).

95 Id.

96

Id.

97 Id.
98 Id.

99 Id. at412-13.

'oo Id. at 413.
101 Id.
102

Id.

103

id.

104

id.

105 Id.
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degree assault. 10 6 The clerk also falsely told the employee that third
degree assault consisted of a felony.' 0 GRS reported to SafeHands
that Dalton had been convicted of a felony, and the inaccurate report
then made its way from SafeHands to CAI, and finally to
Sumitomo. °8 At this point, neither CAI nor SafeHands took any
independent steps to verify GRS's report.l°9
Meanwhile,
Sumitomo discovered that Dalton had
110
significantly misstated periods of employment on his application.
Based on the misstatements and CAI's criminal history report,
Sumitomo decided to withdraw Dalton's employment offer."' When
a Sumitomo representative called Dalton to inform him that the offer
was withdrawn because of his criminal record, Dalton denied that he
had been convicted of a felony. 1 2 The representative told Dalton that
he would call CAI to check the accuracy of the report, and he later
called Dalton to tell him that CAI was standing by the accuracy of its
begin to investigate whether Dalton had
report.11 3 CAI did, however,
114
a felony conviction.
The next day, CAI discovered the mistake and contacted
Sumitomo to correct the report. 1 5 CAI had called the clerk's office
and, after speaking to two court clerks, discovered that third degree
assault was a misdemeanor, not a felony.' 16 Sumitomo reevaluated
Dalton's employment application, but because of Dalton's
misstatements7 about his employment history, Sumitomo decided not
to hire him.' 1
Dalton sued CAI under § 1681e(b), claiming damages for,
among other things, emotional distress and damage to his

106

Id.

107 Id.
108

Id.

109 Id.

11o

Id.

111 Id.
112

Id.

113

id.

114 Id.

115 Id.
116

Id. at 414.

117 Id.
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reputation."i 8 The district court granted summary judgment for CAI
based, in part, on its determination that CAI followed reasonable
procedures. 19 Dalton appealed, and the
120 Fourth Circuit Court of
novo.
de
judgment
the
reviewed
Appeals
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that a credit reporting agency failed to follow
Like the court in Stewart, the court
reasonable procedures.
compared § 1681e(b) with two other sections of the FCRA in which
Congress explicitly placed the burden on the consumer reporting
agency.122 Relying on the same reasoning as Stewart, the court found
that Congress knew how to shift the burden to the defendant. 123 The
burden remained on the plaintiff, however, because Congress had not
done so in § 1681e(b). 124 The court refrained from commenting on
whether an inaccuracy may be so egregious that it creates a
presumption that the agency's actions were unreasonable. 125
Applying this reasoning, the court vacated the order of
summary judgment because a reasonable jury could conclude that it
rely on a clerk's opinion regarding such a
was unreasonable 1to
"crucial question.'' 26 In addition, a jury could conclude "that CAI
should have had procedures in place to instruct its subvendors on the
appropriate
sources for reliable information about a person's criminal
27
record."1

IV. Analysis
In Guimond, the Ninth Circuit properly recognized that the
FCRA is a consumer-oriented statute and that it should therefore be
construed in a light most favorable to the consumer.128 As one
118

Dalton, 257 F.3d at 418.

119 Id.

at 417.

120

Id. at 414.

121

Id. at 416.

122 id.
123 Id.
124 Id.

125 id.
126

Id. at 417.

127 id.

128

Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Kates v. Croker Nat'l Bank, 776 F.2d
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commentator noted, "where the duty to be enforced is that of
maintaining 'reasonable procedures,' the allocation of the burden of
proof will probably determine the outcome of the case."'1 29 For a
plaintiff, this standard is exceedingly difficult to meet.' 30 The
majority of consumers can not afford to pay for the extensive
discovery that would be13 1necessary to prove that a company was
systematically negligent.
However difficult it may be for a plaintiff to prevail in these
cases, the courts cannot disregard the logical interpretation of the
statute. The traditional rule, followed by courts when a statute is
silent, is that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. 132 In addition,
the D.C. and Fourth circuits properly recognized that Congress knew
how to shift the burden, if that was their intent. For example, 15
U.S.C. § 1681m(c) states that "[n]o person shall be held liable for
any violation of this section if he shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that at the time of the alleged violation he maintained
reasonable procedures to assure compliance with the provisions of
this section. 1 33 Clearly, in this section, Congress shifted the burden
to the credit reporting agency. No similar language exists in
§168 1 e(b). Thus, the D.C. and Fourth circuits properly found that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof in § 168le(b) claims.
The logical interpretation of the statute, however, may not do
an adequate job of protecting consumers. The results of one survey
indicates that nearly one-half of credit reports contain inaccurate
information and that nearly twenty percent contain a major
inaccuracy - one that could adversely affect a consumer's eligibility

1396, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985)).
129

Ira

D.

Moskatel,

Panacea or

Placebo? Actions for

Negligent

Noncompliance Under the Federal FairCredit Reporting Act, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
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for credit. 134 In addition, more than eighty percent of Americans are
either "very concerned" or "somewhat concerned" about the privacy
issues in35 regard to the personal information contained in these
reports.
As one critic of the FCRA noted: "[m]ore drastic,
comprehensive solutions are necessary."' 136 One significant flaw in
the FCRA allows credit reporting agencies to release information to
"those it believes intend to use the information in connection with a
credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information
is to be furnished... or otherwise has a legitimate business need for
the information in connection with a business transaction involving
the consumer,"'1 37 or "for employment, insurance, or government
benefits issued on the basis of financial status."' 38 This broad
definition means that almost anyone mayl be eligible to receive the
information collected by credit agencies.
In addition, recent legislation threatens to further weaken the
FCRA. On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the
USA PATRIOT Act, which is intended to attack terrorism through
enhanced security and surveillance procedures, among other
things. 14 Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act targets money
laundering, in part, by amending the FCRA. 141 The amendments
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permit law enforcement to use credit information for conducting
intelligence or counterintelligence activities. 142 Consumer reporting
agencies must furnish consumer reports and any other information in
a consumer's file to an authorized government agency upon written
certification that the information is necessary for the agency to
perform its duties. 143 Furthermore, the amendments allow
investigators prompt access to credit histories without requiring them
to notify unsuspecting consumers. 144 As Kenneth W. Dam, the
Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, indicated in his
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, the money
laundering provisions "highlight the tension between the need 1to
45
share information and the legitimate need for financial privacy."'
He further explained that the need to share financial information must
be "balanced against our fundamental notions of privacy," and that
this is the challenge 46facing the government in implementing antiterrorism legislation.'
In light of these recent changes to the FCRA and the climate
of increased national security, it is important to remember that
individual privacy is a fundamental value in American society. More
national security plans are already in the works that will continue to
threaten individual privacy, including the FCRA. For example,
federal aviation authorities and technology companies will soon
begin testing a new air security screening system designed to
instantly
collect every passenger's
travel history, living
|
arrangements, and large amounts of other personal information. M
The government's plan calls for a computer network linking every
reservation system in the United States to private and government
databases.1 48 The purpose of the network is to profile passenger
activity and find "obscure clues" about potential terrorist threats
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before a flight takes off.
Aviation industry officials have already begun discussions
with legislators about cutting back on some of the privacy protections
in the FCRA in order to allow security officials to use more
passenger credit information., 50 Civil liberties activists have
expressed concerns about the system, believing it to be a huge
surveillance system that will erode individual privacy protections.
As one activist stated, "[i]t really is a profound step for the
government to be conducting background checks on a large
percentage of Americans. We've never done that before. It's
frightening."' 152 Another columnist wrote that this type of "Big
Brother" system may only make Osama bin Laden's prediction,153that
"freedom and human rights in America are doomed," come true.
In passing the FCRA, the federal government gave
individuals control over their -personal information and forced
corporate America to follow suit.15 4 Now that a national security
crisis is at hand, the government is again making changes regarding
individual privacy, but in the opposite direction. 155 There is a risk
that when the government begins sharing more credit information,
businesses will be under less pressure from the government to guard
consumer privacy. 156 Because Washington has removed many
restrictions on how it collects and uses information, it will have little
157
incentive to enforce privacy laws against commercial entities.
Thus, consumers should remain vigilant, monitoring how
corporations work with government and noting whether corporations
149
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V. Proposal
One of the principal tools consumers possess to protect their
privacy is the threat of litigation. When credit reporting agencies are
faced with the prospect of costly litigation, they have an incentive to
comply with consumer protection laws. 59 The courts, however,
should recognize the difficulties a plaintiff has in bringing a claim
under the FCRA, and apply the law accordingly.
Three large credit bureaus dominate the market: TRW,
Equifax, and Trans Union. 160 They each maintain approximately 150
million credit files, and together they control about ninety-nine
percent of the market. 16 1 These agencies also have sole or better
access to critical information because of their role as information
gatherers - they have the files and the personnel who regularly make
records. 162 Clearly, when plaintiffs bring suit under the FCRA they
face a large opponent with nearly endless financial resources and
access to all of the information a plaintiff needs to bring a successful
claim. The courts should recognize this imbalance of power and
allow claims under § 1681e(b) to go forward if the plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case by producing an inaccurate report. The
inaccuracy should, however, be a true inaccuracy rather than merely
adverse, but true, information. Particularly when inconsistencies
relate to criminal records or important financial information, as they
did in Dalton and Stewart, courts should allow cases to proceed upon
a showing of an inaccuracy. Let the plaintiff carry the burden of
proof, but let it be a light burden. Credit reporting agencies can then
rebut the primafacie case easily, if they acted properly, by producing
records and testimony from employees.
When individual liberties, such as privacy, take a back seat to
national security, the courts must take extra steps to protect those
liberties. Although the courts do not have the power to change the
language of the statute, they can apply the statute liberally and in a
way that protects individual privacy. In addition, Congress must
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recognize that although some civil liberties may need to be curtailed
for national security purposes, the most important tool in protecting
consumer privacy is the consumer. Therefore, Congress must not
take away the tools that consumers need to bring successful claims
against credit reporting agencies when their privacy rights are
violated. Likewise, the courts must give consumers a fair chance to
litigate their claims.

VI. Conclusion
The D.C. and Fourth circuits properly held that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof in § 1681e(b) claims under the FCRA. The
language of the statute supports this finding. The courts should
follow the reasoning of the D.C. and Fourth circuits, but allow
plaintiffs to make their prima facie case by showing inaccuracies.
However, recent anti-terrorism legislation puts national security
ahead of individual privacy, and courts must now make every effort
to protect consumer and individual privacy. When the government
begins sharing credit information to protect national security,
businesses will likely be under pressure to aid in this information
sharing. Consumer reporting agencies will be asked to put privacy
interests aside in the interest of national security. However, when
government begins restricting individual privacy protections, we risk
losing sight of the values that are at the core of our society. The
government, courts, and corporate America should tread carefully
and take every necessary step to protect consumer privacy.

